

Beyond Good and Evil: The Sickness Unto Death and Faith

Note to Reader:

The following is a part of a broader project concerning Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy of the Eternal Return and thinking "beyond Good and Evil" and its relation to Soren Kierkegaard's Despair-Resignation/Belief-Faith dialectic. In this way, and for the purpose of giving greater context to this brief discussion, it follows a Deleuzian interpretation of the Eternal Return as the philosophy of Repetition and Difference, or the Repetition of Difference. The following attempts to condense entirely too much in too small a space, and references to Nietzsche will simply be acknowledged in passing while much of the detail of the Kierkegaardian faith dialectic are simply glossed through.

I will begin by discussing and clarifying the implications of the "mystical experience" ala William James. I will suggest that in determining the characteristics and implications of the mystical experience, we will see that Kierkegaard's "being in faith" is itself "a" or "the" mystical experience when this is one and the same which is to say that "a" mystical experience, by its precise character, is "an instance of" or more simply, is "being in faith." This implies the following considerations: first, that faith, as "acting on the strength of the absurd" and as the mystical experience, only occurs through and is the only "cure" to "the sickness unto death" that is Despair. Furthermore, when we grasp that "despair is sin," and that "sin" is *not* opposed to "virtue" (the Good) but to *faith*, then we grasp that Kierkegaard's "faith" dialectic of Despair, Resignation-Belief (in God/the Absolute and hence, in faith), and Faith corresponds to Nietzsche's "moral" philosophy *beyond* Good and Evil, namely, what via Kierkegaard we see as a philosophy of the dialectic of Christian Faith in placing the individual as an individual before God- the Absolute, and through Nietzsche we see in numerous guises as the "Sacred Yes-Saying," or what we might call his "Dionysian Faith" and a "will to power." In this way, it is not unfair to say that I am suggesting a sort of Dionysian Christianity, in the precise ways that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard describe these. This manner of demonstrating this "connection" is certainly not the only one, and in passing I will occasionally highlight "other" avenues by which to explore this intersection when particularly relevant to the specific task at hand. The "cash value" of this suggestion is manifold, first, that the "furthest" one gets through the "Understanding," "consciousness," "reason or rationality," or more simply, here thinking of Wittgenstein, through "words," in regards to the human experience *as such*, is indeed Faith in the precise way that Kierkegaard describes this. Furthermore, this is the "furthest" that Nietzsche suggests that we go as well, in that it is the form of "beyond Good and Evil" that Nietzsche espouses as the form of the self's "going under to get across," and his controversial depiction of the "ubermensch." This is to say that a Kierkegaardian Knight of Faith is the self-same form as the "ubermensch," and that Nietzsche's suggestion that the "ubermensch" is more man than man just as man is more ape than ape, is that self-same "faith potential" implicit in the human experience as such, whereby the self becomes its-self only in the absolute relation to the absolute, which "goes under" through infinite resignation and Despair to go across to "becoming ones-self."

We will begin with determining the characteristics of the mystical experience as it is here that the “experience of that which can not be understood to be experienced” is precisely experienced. Hence, it is here that an irreducible “gap” in understanding as such is exposed “on understanding’s own terms” which is to say that descriptively the essential characteristic of the mystical experience is that “it is the experience of that which can not be understood.” Or, put differently, and thinking of Wittgenstein here, *in words*, the mystical experience is that experience that can not be immediately referred to in words,” what can not be explained, described, characterized, or experienced “in words,” which is to say “in concepts,” which is to say “in the understanding,” or “in consciousness as consciousness.” The degree to which it is “consciously” experienced as such is only the degree to which the mystical experience “in its essence” implicates but *is intrinsically not exhausted in* this conscious experience or conscious understanding of “what it is.” The degree to which anything is “said” of the mystical experience, *even by the subject who experiences it*, or the degree to which it is “understood” as “mystical experience” and not “some other type of experience” is only the degree to which this “conscious” description (or experience) is not the essential characteristic of the *mystical* experience as such and hence does not “give the experience its meaning” as mystical experience. That the essential characteristics of the distinctly mystical experience imply more than this is certainly true, but where these further characteristics arise is precisely “further” into this realm of “that which can not be understood in and by the understanding.” In other words, the metaphysical implications of the distinctly mystical experience are such that the experience refers to a “Real” (or functionally “actual”) experience, and not a “mere hallucination.” The nature of this “reality” is potentially two-fold: either the reality of the experience is Real in an absolute sense, it is absolutely and irreducibly Real in the self-same sense that the Real as such is Real, and hence the same “reality” as that assumed of the “consciousness” that it is characteristically opposed to descriptively. This is to say that Reality “itself” is intrinsically “split” in this way and is simultaneously that which is Real and that which is Absurd, which is indeed to say that in a technical, “real” sense, that Reality is Absurd (from the perspective of consciousness and the understanding where saying that “reality is partially absurd” would be absurd and hence the same exact statement). Or the reality of the mystical experience might be the reality of the experience of that which is fundamentally “not Real” in an absolute sense. This would entail that the experience’s “reality” is purely and irreducibly a “subjective” truth whose reality is that it, as a distinctly mystical experience of that which is fundamentally not real, “really” so effects a subject who itself is Real without making any metaphysical claim on the reality of the experience “itself” or to “that which was experienced.” However, for this latter distinction to actually be a “real” distinction implies that the mystical experience as such is indeed not meaningfully different from mere “hallucination,” and any further purported implications of its distinctly “mystical” nature are literally and actually *purely* subjective both in the experience itself (which is true for any experience of that which is beyond that which can be experienced consciously or in words and the understanding) and that which might be said of it via further characterization and specification. In other words, we would be done with this exploration here. In so far as no metaphysical implications of the Reality of the experience or that which was experienced are drawn from determining the experience as “purely subjective” then this “pure subjectivity” is only to be considered as the “conscious experience” of that which is beyond

consciousness, which is subsumed under the first metaphysical claim on the experience's implying a "split reality," an "absurd reality." This is all to say that the metaphysical implications of the mystical experience in this way are that Reality *in itself* is fundamentally, in the last instance, inaccessible or "more than" the understanding and consciousness implicated in the merely tangible worldliness of the human living; and if consciousness and the understanding are presumed to be "part" of this reality (which they must) then it is but in an irreducibly "separating" gesture in some manner from that which "Really is" and which is presupposed in their own actuality/reality.

It is here that we arrive at the crux of the problem in "understanding" the mystical experience and whether anything more need be said of it than that it is the "real experience of that which is intrinsically beyond what can be consciously experienced or communicated via the understanding." Put differently, is there anything further to say of the experience *in the understanding* beyond describing the mere particularities of "actual" mystical experiences, particularities which are really irrelevant to the essence of the mystical experience itself as they are particularities only communicable in words "describing an experience" that is fundamentally not describable in words, at this level. Two considerations are relevant here, first, the presumed "reality" of the experience (both of the experience and that which was experienced where these are irreducibly the same as they are both "beyond" the understanding as the latter is exhausted in the former by the nature of the experience, which is to say that the mystical experience is again presumed to have its effect as mystical *only* in the conscious world "to the self" who experienced it, otherwise it is again merely a hallucination utterly disconnected from conscious reality or at least meaningless to the conscious self who experienced it other than arbitrarily or "however it might so effect the subject"), and secondly, the characteristics in the "conscious world of understanding" that might distinguish an experience as mystical rather than utterly meaningless. As to the "reality of an Absurd Reality," there are a plethora of "objective" ways (which is only to say "in the world of understanding" or simply the "consciously accessible/describable tangible world") in which this has been described and "empirically demonstrated." Whether we choose to examine recent neuroscientific advancements as to the "temporal gap" between conscious recognition of an experience and the experience itself, or look towards recent cognitive scientific "theories of consciousness," or more glaringly obviously to the complexities of theoretical physics which, in numerous ways, imply the "primacy of movement to identity," or simply put that the law of identity, that $A=A$, "really" breaks down in innumerable ways in the objective world (the world that can be made an object of by the understanding, or "in words")- we need only consider Heisenberg's uncertainty principle or the "observer dependency" phenomenon, or the 13 dimensions (or whatever they are up to now) in string theory, etc.

This is all to say that in innumerable directions "the gap" between the conscious world of tangible appearance and "that which this tangible world really is" "in itself," is or "has been discovered to be," even upon the grounds of the most rigorous of physical and natural sciences, those so called "empirical sciences," an infinite one. This "infinite" is only to mark the essential open-endedness of the relation between the tangible world and that which can be consciously understood, described, or in general "said about it" as an "object." We really need only look at the metaphysical implications of Wittgenstein's theory of language, whereby he demonstrates that the meaning of words is essentially

exhausted in their use and functioning which is fundamentally a matter of inter-subjectivity rather than an objectively formal content. This is to say that from Wittgenstein, we learn of the irreducible gap between “meaning” and “objectivity,” or we learn that there is no such thing as absolutely “Objective Truth” communicable in words always by “subjects,” and we learn Kierkegaard’s fundamental mistrust of any objective perspective bypassing the conscious life of the subject expressing itself through concepts and words in the understanding precisely in making an object of the subject and its “objective nature” “in itself.” This is further to say that one can not get “even more objectively subjective” by going “further into” this “subjectivity” and treating it as mere “object” as the psychoanalytic tradition in general does, and in a slightly different but related way, certain Deconstructionists w/ an Ethics of the Other do.¹

The Kierkegaardian and Nietzschean perspectives, in this light, will understand the subject itself as an impenetrable web of intersecting “determining” or “embodying” factors of any range of sorts in the world where the law of Identity, where A in fact does equal A, functions, which is precisely the world of the subject in consciousness, the understanding, and in and through words, where anything “beyond” this merely relates back to “that which is not self-evidently itself,” i.e. the presumed subject, or that which “is really the subject” or is “serving this function,” for instance a Deleuzian BwO (“body without organs”) might very well “be this,” but is only ever this “in words” which is to say “in the understanding” which is to say “in the subject.” This is only to note that these considerations “pointing beyond” the subject’s conscious self do not thereby automatically entail the “dissolution” of the conscious subject’s “genuine reality” “at this level of consciousness,” nor do they imply that “nothing more can be said” about this conscious subject and its reality at this level thereby leaving it to an entirely “subjective” reality that “nothing can ever be said about” in regards to the subjects relating to that which is “beyond it.” There is certainly more to be said about these glossed over claims; the point here is that there are indeed several avenues and “good arguments to be made” to grasp the purported “metaphysical” claim of a fundamentally Absurd Reality, in this strict sense suggested here. Indeed this then becomes the fundamental crux of whether there is anything further to be said “in words” or “through the understanding” about this fundamental “gap.”²

¹ Deconstructionists essentially treat as that which is Real in human conscious subjectivity as the “innocent good will of a Kantian fetus” or what they refer to as an “ethical orientation to the Other” before it enters the world of objectivity (reality, in a technical sense, not polemically) which utterly consumes its ethical or moral gesture. They would see this “emptiness” as an implicit emptiness of meaning as such absolutely

² This might be said to be the cornerstone of the “metaphysical implications” of “post-modernity” more generally; certain Saussurian and/or Lacanian theories of meaning portray this gap as the “lack at the heart of meaning” and hence the “lack at the heart of the subject,” where the unifying gesture granting coherency to a system of meaning and/or the subject is the functioning of “filling this lack” ultimately “arbitrarily,” which is to say “not on the grounds of the system or the consciousness of the subject” but from a “constitutive outside” to the system. This infinite gap then, from these perspectives, purports nothing more to be said “in the understanding” of “what this lack is in itself” besides that it is an irreducible “lack;” it is indeed “nothing” and is only functionally “automatically” filled by conditions outside of the understanding’s own terms. This is the way in which the gap is interpreted as purely a “structural” affair (of reality) which is the way in which these are “post-structuralist” metaphysical theories more generally. This is also the debate between so called “ontologies of lack” versus “abundance,” where the present perspective falls on the side of “abundance” in a more explicitly Deleuzian manner, but also following the

Now to the characteristics of the mystical experience in the “conscious world of understanding;” the degree to which any of these features, such as that it entail “religious” or “spiritual” implications and effects (in a worldly and hence *not* purely subjective manner), or that it occurs with a sense of “awe” etcetera, are essentially characteristic of the mystical experience as merely descriptions of its worldly manifesting of that which is beyond the understanding. These features might very well be essential to the distinctly mystical experience, but *only* in so far as they relate to the consciously accessible world *through* the Absurd characteristic of the experience itself, in other words, they are merely ancillary descriptions implied by the experience’s “being Absurdly real” in the way that we have described. However, these “ancillary” considerations are precisely the characteristics that relate the mystical experience to the conscious self who experiences it *on the terms of the Absurd* rather than the Understanding. In other words, these characteristics are what, in the realm of understanding and through words, we might say further about the mystical experience other than that it is simply the experience of the reality that is “beyond” our consciously accessible one.

If the mystical experience is to be more than simply a hallucination, there is a presumed relation between its experience being “beyond” understanding and the world of understanding itself. This is to say there is a relationship between the experience itself and its being the conscious experience of being an experience beyond consciousness. This is how it has been noted that the mystical experience itself is not a “pure” one in so far as anything is said of it; the mystical experience in this way implicitly has a “process character” whereby its implications, effects, and overall “interpretation” into the subject’s conscious life and experience are all “part of the experience itself,” in words, in the conscious self. Again, however, the *particular* implications, effects, “content,” and “interpretations” of the experience have *nothing essentially* to do with the Truth of the experience itself and are simply the “translation” of the experience into that “side of reality” that is consciousness and the understanding. In other words, the “reality” of the experience as reported through the understanding speaks *nothing* to the purported religious “meaning” of the experience. In this way the “meaning” of the *actual* mystical experience itself is *purely* a subjective one and is exhausted there; however, there is indeed more to be said *in the understanding* as to the form of the relationship of the Absurd to conscious understanding that the presumed potential truth of the mystical experience betrays. The degree to which the mystical experience is not simply a hallucination, and the degree to which the particular content “given to the experience” in the understanding is essentially unrelated to its being distinctly *mystical*, is the degree to which the mystical experience implies *in the understanding*, only Kierkegaard’s dialectic of faith, whereby the individual “acting on the strength of the absurd” places himself in an absolute relation to the absolute. And indeed this is absurd, and betrays that whatever is distinctly mystical about the mystical experience has *absolutely nothing to do with what is said about it* by the subject who “experienced it” or “is experiencing” it; whatever is said about it in the name of “being the mystical experience” is *simply* Absurd and nothing more. That it is more than this in itself is purely “in,” “for,” and “to,” the subject experiencing it, and indeed *nothing follows at all* from the mystical experience itself in so far any particular “explanation” of it says anything about the “nature” of that which was

metaphysical claims of James’ “world of becoming” and those like it.

mystically experienced. What follows from the perceived “actuality” of a mystical experience is purely what follows from its real *possibility* as that which exceeds the understanding on the understanding’s own terms. This is to say that from the perspective of the understanding, the subject who “actually” experiences the mystical experience as mystical experience and not simply hallucination or “some other inexplicable experience” is implicitly a “knight of faith” in Kierkegaard’s terminology. As such, the relationship of the mystical experience and the subject experiencing this to the world of understanding is purely one of the Absurd, whereby the understanding arrives at the point of merely “belief that this can happen,” the belief that there is “faith” as such and that *this* implies a relationship of the self to the Absolute *through* the understanding itself. In other words, while it is often assumed that the “meaning” of the mystical experience is simply “that it really happens” and that therefore “religion as such” is “justified” as referring to a “real spiritual realm” “beyond” or to “real experiences,” this is utterly beside the point. Put differently, “in words” there is no difference between the hallucination and the mystical experience, for the mystical experience is utterly Absurd which is precisely its power. This further means, however, that the mystical experience is purely a matter of the individual’s relationship to the Absolute as that which is utterly beyond the understanding. This alters the “meaning” of the mystical experience whereby what is distinctly *mystical* about an experience is actually never in the particular experience itself (which, as we have said is irreducibly simply an absurd hallucination) and is rather in the subjects *relating* to that experience, which is a process, and which is precisely the process of the subject’s *being in faith*. Again, the degree to which this is not so and that indeed “nothing can be said” about the experience is very well fine, and then, well, nothing can be said about it at all and *descriptively* it is indeed *merely* a hallucination (and the degree to which the subject who experiences the mystical experience would “disagree” is utterly irrelevant, for if the experience was “real” then nothing anybody “says” of it matters anyway *to the subject* of experience himself, and the degree to which words are spoken of it in explanation and description is the degree to which the experience as a distinctly *mystical* one is indeed “related” to the understanding as that which within the understanding “points beyond itself” to the Absolute).

It is often assumed that the essential characteristics of Kierkegaardian faith are relatively straightforward and clear. It is assumed that the subject makes an utterly decisionistic “conscious” “either/or” “choice” and “a leap of faith” “on the strength of the absurd” into the relation with the Absolute. The essential characteristics of this faith are commonly understood to be the “strict subjectivity” of the decision, its being a “matter of the absurd” “opposed to reason” where God as the Absolute has nothing to do with, ought to have nothing to do with, and can have nothing to do with, the “mere worldliness” of objectivity and conscious understanding, knowledge, and reason, so that the subject enters into faith or “has faith” by “deciding” or “knowing” that he does merely because he “knows it to be true” “beyond all reason.” The simplest way to clear this common misunderstanding is to say very precisely that the subject who is in a relation of faith, and hence “has faith,” *can say nothing to “prove” his having this faith or being in faith*, and the degree to which this subject says anything “about his faith” *at all*, in words, and hence through consciousness and the understanding, is utterly Absurd and meaning-less in a spiritual sense, from the perspective of faith; it is an empty statement referring only to its potential truth *purely* in the subjectivity of this individual self being in faith (which is crucial as this is implicitly *potentially* so of anyone and everyone) and hence is beyond the

Understanding and hence “beyond Good and Evil,” which is to say “beyond Virtue.” This is precisely the way in Kierkegaard describes that “the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith,” where sin is precisely “despair-” purely a “sickness of the self” indeed “not wanting to be the self which it is and is self-evidently not, consciously. But this is precisely to say that there is *a lot to say*, in words, about being in a relation of faith- that it is *only* the subject’s acting on the Absurd and hence only that which *can only be thought of* as the subjects being in an Absurd relationship with the Absurd, which is to say, an Absolute relationship to the Absolute (were the subject to “try and put it into words,” it is the Absurd Thought which is not just *any* thought, i.e. not just a hallucination that “makes no sense,” but is rather the subject’s thinking *through* the universal and thinking the paradox of (its own) existence as a self), and hence potentially/inherently/always an Offence to the Universal and the Universal in the subject, the conscious self of the understanding. It is *difficult, the most difficult* “thing” that a self can do, to relate its-self absolutely to the absolute. In fact, *it can not even be said*, and this is its mystical nature, the Knight of Faith’s *very faith is the mystical experience*, and his very being in faith is to become himself in being “cured” of his sickness unto death, Despair, which is his worldly condition of “not being self-evidently ones-self,” or being an eternal self that then might be related absolutely to the absolute (that the infinite gap between subjectivity and objectivity is always channeled through “the subject” and his “merely conscious world” in words in the ways we have described).

This is the way in which Kierkegaard “thinks beyond,” “in words through concepts,” that is to “dialectically,” there merely being an “infinite gap” between subjectivity and objectivity, or consciousness and unconsciousness, or the self-evident transparency of movement and identity more generally (the “breakdown” of the law of identity in the “objective” “empirical” world), which is to say, that he thinks the “self” “beyond Good and Evil.” Kierkegaard says that despair is “not wanting in despair to be oneself,” and that the self (the subject as we have been speaking of it), as not self-evidently its-self, is a “relation that relates to itself,” specifically the relation of the syntheses of “the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity,” to this synthesis itself. In other words, despair is that the self is the “relation of these syntheses (relationships)” and that this synthesis is Absurd from the perspective of the finite, the temporal, and freedom which make up the world of consciousness, the Understanding, and the world of “words” as we have been referring to them. God as such is the Absolute, is the Absolute unity of the infinite and the finite and the temporal and the eternal that is itself an Absurd Unity, or a “non-unity” and the breakdown of thought as such, the breakdown of the self’s being self-evidently itself, and is that “Absurd thought referring to that which is beyond what is thinkable” which, when “brought back into thought,” is “the paradox of existence” to the conscious self, where it is only *not* paradoxical “in faith” or through the belief in faith that a human being is a sickness unto a death, and that this is precisely the condition of a self becoming fully its-self in an absolute relation to the absolute. The relation of faith is in the “freedom” of there being no “necessary” relating of the finite to the infinite or the temporal to the eternal, “necessities” being confined to the finite and the temporal. This “freedom” is constrained, however, precisely by the subject’s himself being finite, temporal, and subsumed within the necessity of finitude. The subject’s freedom then is precisely to “become one’s self” which is the process of a self’s being the “constant” relating of these heterogenous orders of synthesis that do not self-evidently relate and only relate “all to each other simultaneously” in and as the self, the subject. Kierkegaard says in these regards that “this

then is the formula which describes the state of the self when despair is completely eradicated: in relating to itself and in wanting to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the power that established it," this power being the Absolute, and this also being the formula that describes "being in faith." The subject in faith is then the subject who fully expresses their infinitude in their finitude, their eternal consciousness in their temporal existing, and their freedom in and as "their necessity" (the necessity precisely being their "finitude" and "temporality" and their being this relationship of syntheses). Precisely because the subject is *only* finite, temporal, and exists as a particular within the Universal that is the entire world of all that is, can be, has been, and will be "in the understanding" or in the tangible world of appearance and necessity, that, as we have seen, is presumptively not "all that is" in precisely an Absolute sense, is why the subject in faith is dialectically higher than the subject of the understanding, the subject of "good and evil," and can say nothing about his relationship to the Absolute in this way. Furthermore, the subject's being in this relationship of Faith implies his having overcome Despair, indeed the highest overcoming of Despair is "to be able to lose one's understanding and with it the whole finite world whose stockbroker it is, and then on the strength of the absurd get exactly the same finitude back again." This is why one can not think one's way into faith, thought can only make one arrive at the "paradox of faith" in this way. One can "believe in faith" and "believe in God" as the Absolute, and hence admire faith and "love" God as loving one's life in "infinite resignation," because one can literally have "no reason" in the Understanding as it is but Absurd that one can resign one's "understanding," which is precisely to renounce all worldliness, and simultaneously fully "consciously want" this finitude precisely as one's becoming one's own self in the relation of faith.

While more certainly needs to be clarified as to the faith dialectic, the "point" of these reflections is the following: first, that the "faith" relation is the highest dialectical form of the self from the perspective of their being the "infinite gap" between the subject and objectivity in all the ways previously mentioned; secondly, that self-consciously, "in words," the highest relation one can *think* oneself into is going "through the dialectic of Despair" the "infinite resignation" of one's self to the Absolute which is to believe that one's spiritual life (which is now *higher* for one than the worldly Understanding, or "moral" dialectic of good and evil) is only "expressed" ultimately "internally" and that any external determinations of "good and evil" very well occur and with "good reasons" even by the faith relation, but that these worldly judgements carry *absolutely* no intrinsic spiritual significance and in fact can carry *no* spiritual "worldly validity" on their own grounds. This is all to say that the worldly dialectic of good and evil judgements is not Absolute and is a "political" matter of transience and change, which is the way in which Kierkegaard says that "every generation goes no further than faith" no matter how "far" they go elsewhere. Thirdly, simply because an unknown "beyond" the human subject constitutes the human subject does not mean that "absolutely anything said of this beyond" is thereby "equally True" in the understanding. Once *anything* is said about this beyond it is brought into the Understanding, consciousness, and words; and is now subject to the furthest implications of this, and it can *purely* be a matter of the subject's relating to this beyond which reaches its dialectical height when that part of the subject that is "conscious" so to speak is "brought into an immediate relation with that which is beyond him," the "faith relation," which is to say that the subject brings his entire life "into himself" in becoming himself in that same way that Nietzsche's philosophy of beyond Good and Evil

entails a Sacred Yes-Saying of completely renouncing renunciation (ressentiment) in affirming one's entire living and existence, in "bringing the world unto ones-self."

Kierkegaard famously describes that "if there were no eternal consciousness in a man, if at the bottom of everything there were only a wild ferment, a power that twisting in dark passions produced everything great or inconsequential; if an unfathomable, insatiable emptiness lay his beneath everything, what would life be but despair?"³ This "eternal consciousness" in man is simply that he has a thought of himself as a self, or, that his life is "also" not *self-evidently* "only" this ultimate emptiness and "indifference", not self-evidently only this "indifference" of the Absurd to conscious thought, or, to put it differently, that man can "fathom" a thought of this unfathomable condition is his not "being self-evidently only in this."

faith-despair/sin, go through despair to arrive at faith, thinking beyond good and evil, going under to get across, sacred yes-saying. God is the Absolute, that which is unthinkable, the Absurd, and Love, where love is absurd and the form of thinking beyond good and evil, the way in which one.

³ Pg. 14